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BRIEF 0'F AP·PELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocntory appeal from a decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Merrill C. Faux, 
.Jndge, presiding, \dwrein Judge Faux refused to grant 
the motion to dismiss which had been filed by the defend-
ants. 
f-i'l'A 1'J£MENT OF FACTS 
Donald R. Bosch is the Supervisor of Sales and 
U st> Taxes, Auditing Division, lTtah State Tax Commis-
sion (R. 7), and Panl M. Holt is the Director of the Audit-
ing- Di,·ision of tlw Utah State rrax Commission (R. 3), 
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and it is their official duty to supervise the auditors of 
the Utah State Tax Commission. 
One of the audits performed by those auditors was 
an audit of the books of Utah Steel and Iron Company, 
and the auditors returned a report showing a total sales 
tax due, including penalty and interest, of $16,865.45. 
Upon receipt of this report, a form letter (R. 5 & 9) was 
sent, dated March 12, 1969, which informed Utah Steel 
and Iron Company of the findings of the Sales and Use 
Tax Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion, and clearly informed them that if they did not 
agree with the proposed adjustments, they could submit 
a request for redetermination at any time within ten days. 
On June 18, 1969, another form letter (R. 6 & 10) was 
sent which informed Utah Steel and Iron Company that 
the proposed adjustment had been approved by the Ftah 
State Tax Commission and constituted an assessment 
which was due and payable unless a petitjon for redeter-
mination was filed within ten days. The record does not 
show whethe.r a petition for redetermination was filed 
after either one of the letters, but such a petition would 
not have any significance in this case, in which the tax 
assessed is not in question, but only whether the defend-
ants, in their individual capacity, are subject to this type 
of action, and also whether they were entitled to have 
their motion to dismiss granted. 
Both letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) had the name of Donald 
R. Bosch typed in the upper right hand corner, and both 
letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) were purportedly signed by Paul 
M. Holt and his signature was rubber stamped by mem-
bers of his staff (R. 3). 
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Those two letters (R. 5, 6, 9 & 10) were the only 
direct contact, either written or verbal, which the defend-
ants had with the plaintiff. The only indirect contact was 
the auditing of the books of the plaintiff by other auditors 
of the Utah State Tax Commission. The uncontroverted 
affidavits of the defendants clearly set forth the above 
and also state that this was merely the normal procedure 
followed for thousands of similar cases each year (R. 4 & 
S). Those affidavits also state that all actions by the de-
fendants (the mailing of two form letters) were per-
formed in their official capacities, although the plaintiff, 
by and through its president, filed an affidavit which 
denied that the defendants were acting in the course of 
their employment. 
Following the sending of tht> two form letters, the 
plaintiff filed this action in the district court 
that: 
''2. That on or about the 12th day of March, 
1969 these defendants have conspired together to 
harass, annoy, threaten and intimidate the plain-
tiff, and that since the said time they have un-
la1vfully threatened, intimidated, harassed and 
annoyed the plaintiff, acting together and in con-
cert 'vith each other until it has been necessary 
for the plaintiff to and the plaintiff has discon-
tinued its business and suffered damage in the 
of $275,000.00, no part of which has been paid. 
3. rrhat the said acts on the part of these de-
fendants havt> lwen deliberate. malicious and with-
out probable cause and the plaintiff has in addi-
tion thereto suffered punitive damages in the sum 
of $25.000.00.'' (R.1) 
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Immediately after the filing of the complaint, the de-
fendants filed their answer, along with their affidavits 
and Motion to Dismiss. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon the hearing of the motion to dismiss of the 
defendants, that motion was denied, whereupon the de-
fendants filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, 
which was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal is from the denial of the motion to dis-




THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SHOWED SUF-
FICIENT SPECIFIC FACTS TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS 
NO GENUINE ISSUE FOR TRIAL, WHICH REQUIRED THE 
GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procednre pro-
vides, in part: 
"If, on a motion asserting tlw defense num-
bered ( 6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, tlw motion shall he 
treated as one for summary judgment and dis-
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posed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rnle 56." 
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss filed by the 
defendants herein, affidavits of both defendants were 
Jlrt'sented to, and not excluded by the court, as was a con-
troverting affidavit signed by the president of the plain-
tiff corporation. Thus, the motion should clearly have 
been treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
eedure. 
Rnle 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
iirovides, in part, as follo\vs: 
''\Yhen a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
h.'; nffidwcits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
smnmary judgment, if appropriate, shall be en-
ttired against him." (Emphasis added) 
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure 
is to pierep tht> pleadings and to assess the proof in order 
to SN' there is a genuine need for a trial. 6 
Jfnore's Ferleral Practice, 2nd Ed., Rule 56, p. 2022. 
The affidavits filt>d by the defendants herein, and the con-
trn\'(-'l'ting affidavit filed by the defendant do not show 
t!iat then' is a genuine issue for trial. 
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Defendants' affidavits (R. 3 & 7) clearly show that 
they have never had any personal contact of any type or 
nature with the plaintiff, either written or oral, or over 
the telephone, other than two form letters which were 
sent to the plaintiff company and which merely stated that 
an assessment had been made and if Utah Steel and Iron 
Company did not agree with the assessment they should 
petition for a redetermination within ten days. Those 
letters do not show any possibility of the defendants "con-
spiring together to harass, annoy, threaten and intimi-
date the plaintiff," nor do they show that the actions of 
the defendants were deliberate, malicious or without prob-
able cause as was alleged in the complaint filed by the 
plaintiff herein. 
The affidavits filed by the defendants also stated 
that any and all acts, specifically the acts of mailing two 
letters to the plaintiff, were done in their official capacity 
as employees of the Utah State Tax Commission, and 
there is nothing which would indicate that there was any 
action carried on in any other capacity than as employees 
of the Utah State Tax Commission, other than the contro-
verting affidavit of the plaintiff herein. However, the 
affidavit of the plaintiff should clearly have been ignored 
by the judge in hearing the motion, because of additional 
provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides as follows : 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on versmial knowfrdge, shall set forth siich 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, cind dwll 
show affirmatively that the affiant is compPtent 
to testify to the matters stated there in .. , ( E111-
phasis added) 
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The controverting affidavit of the plaintiff states 
that the defendants were not acting as agents or employ-
ees of the Utah State Tax Commission at the time an 
audit was conducted on their books, records and affairs, 
and it further denies that they were acting in the course 
of their employment. However, that controverting affi-
davit is somewhat confusing in that it also states that 
"at the present time the Utah State Tax Commission was 
and is conducting an audit of the plaintiff's books, records 
and affairs ... " Thus, the plaintiff has admitted that 
the audit was performed by the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion, but seems to assert that the actions of the defendants 
in sending two form letters informing them of the results 
of that audit were not within the scope of their employ-
ment. The affidavits filed by the defendants clearly show 
that such is otherwise and under Rule 56( e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited above, the plaintiff 
m 11st have perso·nal knowledge that the defendants are 
not acting as agents or employees of the Tax Commission, 
and he 1nust also be competent to testify to that matter 
mid that testimony must be admissible into evidence to be 
considered during a hearing on a motion to dismiss, 
\\·hich is being considered as a motion for summary 
jndgrnent.. 
This court has had occasion to consider the recently 
arnPndt>d Utah rule in Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 
c1::3G P.2d 1021 (1968). This was a slip and fall case in 
which the defendant moved for summary judgment which 
\\'as granted and this court affirmed on appeal. In the 
plaintiff's complaint, she had alleged that there was 
l':atn, slush and snO\\' on the floor of the defendant's cafe 
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which caused her to fall. She later amended the complaint 
when she learned through depositions that there was no 
water, slush or snow on the floor, to allege that the de-
fendant was negligent in applying an excessive amount 
of wax, which negligence had caused her fall. The de-
fendant's answer denied that there was excessive wax on 
the floor and the defendant moved for a summary judg-
ment. 
The plaintiff submitted an affidavit of an expert 
who had run some tests on a sample floor and the affi-
davit of the expert had been to the effect that the floor 
was dangerous because there was not enough wax on the 
floor. This court pointed out that the motion for sum-
mary judgment was correctly granted because of the 
discrepancy between the pleading which alleged excessive 
wax and the plaintiff's affidavit which alleged not enough 
wax was a basis for a dismissal. The problem was that 
the affidavit did not support the allegations of the com-
plaint. Id. at 263. See also: United American Insurance 
Company v. Willey, 21 Utah 2d 279, 285, 44 P.2d 755 
(1968). Defendants respectfnlly submit to this court 
that the plaintiff herein has fa]led to substantiate the 
allegations of its complaint jn its controverting affidavit 
and that therefore the trial court should have accepted 
the allegations of the defendants as to the nature and 
types of contacts with plaintiff and granted the motion 
for summary judgment. Defendants also respectfully 
submit that there was no valid evjdence before the court 
that they 'vere not acting in the scope of their employ-
ment, and the plaintiff was not competent to testify to 
such a fact. The facts show that tlw defendants' only 
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actions were sending form letters commonly sent by the 
Utah State Tax Commission and this was not denied by 
the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is well aware that those 
were the only actions performed by the defendants herein. 
It is also respectfully submitted that, based on the affi-
davits of the defendants, and either with or without the 
controverting affidavit of the plaintiff, there is no genu-
ine issue for trial, and the defendants' motion to dismiss 
should have been granted. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE NOT LIABLE IN A PRIVATE 
ACTION FOR GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY. 
Although the plaintiff denies that the defendants 
were acting in the scope of their authority, the facts clear-
ly show othenvise. The affida\its filed by the dt•fendants 
are nncontroverted in the statement that the only contact 
hetween the plaintiff and defendant was two form letters 
on \Yhieh the dt>ft'ndants' names \Yere typed and rubber 
:'tam1wd. Th i0 is 11.11contr01;erted prim a f acie evidmice 
that the defendants actPd in good faith within the scope 
of their eniployment. 
rr1w courts appear unanimous in their decisions that a 
public officer is not liable in a private action for acts 
twrfornwd in good faith within the scope of his authority. 
()7 C.J.S., Officers, Section 125 et seq. 
In K P1ley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 at 131, (1st Cir. 
1 U(i3). the court said: 
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"A long line of decisions has, both before and 
since, recognized that in many instances 'the pro-
tection of the public interest by shielding responsi-
ble government officers against the harassment 
and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded 
damage suits based on acts done in the exercisl' 
of their official responsibilities' outweighs 'the 
protection of the individual citizen against damage 
caused by oppressin' or malicious action on the 
part of public officers.'" (Emphasis addt>d) 
As Chief Judge Learned Hand said in Gregoire v. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d (2nd Circ. 1949), Cert. den. 339 U.S. 949, 
70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 19G3, at p. 581: 
"The justification [for denying ** '' 
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim 
is well fonndPd until the case has been tried, and 
that to submit all officials, the innocent as "·ell as 
the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to tht> in-
evitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the 
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their 
duties." 
In Kelley i:. Dunne, supra, at 132-133, the court sPt 
forth the following common denominators in disallo\\·ing 
pri,·ate suits against public officPrs. 
1. The conduct of the dt>fondant-official was within 
the scope of agPncy powers. 
2. Tht> act complaim'd of was prima faciP in aecord-
with tlw offieer's duties and enstoman· 
beha,·ior. 
3. Tlw frep PX.Pre1tw of the public function ont-
wPighed privatP intPresb. 
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The Montana Supreme Court has held that immunity 
from personal liability is not extended to the official for 
his own sake but because the public inh•rest requires full 
inde1wndence of action and decision on his part, unin-
fluenced by any fear or apprehension of consequences 
personal to himself. JI einecke v. 1ll cFa.rland, 206 P.2d 
1012, 1014 (1949). 
In Industrial Comniission v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz. 
App. 100, 423 P.2d 375 (1967), the Court said: 
"The very purpose of the rule of immunity 
afforded to public officers was to avoid potential 
lwrassmeut and/or coercion by means of a threat 
of a lawsuit." (Emphasis added) 
One of the best statements of the rule of law which 
;-;pt>aks against tlw plaintiff in thP instant case is in Lip-
man c. Brisl){UU' Flemrntary School Dist., S.C. of Cali-
fornia, 359 P.2d 465, at 4(i7 (1961). 
"Becausf• of important policy considnations, 
the rule ltas become established that government 
officials arP not personally liable for their discre-
tionary acts \\·ithin the scope of their authority 
PH'n though it is alleged that their conduct was 
malicious. (Citations omitted.) The subjection of 
officials, tlw innoct>nt a:-; well as the guilty, to the 
hurdPn of a trial and to the danger of its outcome 
would impair tlwir zeal in the performance of their 
fnnctions, and it is better to leave tlw injur:1» un-
than to subject h01wst officials to the 
eonstant drPad of retaliation." 
Th0 Utah Supreme Court recently considered this 
prnhlum whc11 construction of a junior high school result-
c·d in destruction of an irrigation ditch and landoWJ1ers in 
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Utah's Granite School District instituted suit against the 
school district and the individual board nwmbers. The 
defendants' motion to dismiss was granted by the Third 
District Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed: 
''In common with other public officials, they 
[school board members] have authority to do 
whatever is reasonably necessary in carrying out 
the duties imposed upon tht•m. It would be quite 
impractical and unfair to require them to act at 
their own risk. This would not be disruptive 
of the proper functioning of public institutions, 
but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and 
responsible persons from accepting responsibili-
ties of public office. Accordingly, it is the settled 
policy of the law that when a public official acts i 11 
good faith, believing what he does to be within 
the scope of his authority and in the b11e of his 
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes 
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment.'' 
Anderson 1:. Granifr School Di..,frict, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413 
P.2d 597 (1969) at 599. Citing: Roe i-. Lundstrom, 89 
Utah 520, 57P.2d1128 (1936). 
The case at hand appears to be one of the specific 
type for which the rule is intended, i.e., this case appears 
to be a vindictive and ill-founded law snit which was filed 
purely for harassment, intimidation and/or coercion 
of public officials to J>rPvent any future audits of the 
plaintiff hy tlw Utah f;tab,• Tax Commission, or to force 
a pnhlic agency to eomprnmise a just and lawful dPbt of 
that agency offrring to dismiss the spurious action 
in exchangP for a compromise of the just deht (as has 
heretofore lw<·n off Pr<'d in this case). rl,o iwrmit snits 
of this wonld be tantamount to blackmail and 
shonld not b<-> permittt>d, mneh less eneom·agt>d. 
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POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT A VOID THE IMP ACT OF 
GOVERNMENT AL IMMUNITY BY SUING A PUBLIC OFFI-
CER IN A PRIVATE SUIT. 
The doctrine named above in Point II, that a public 
officer is not liable for his good faith acts performed 
within the scope of his authority, is a form of the common-
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. That doctrine, of 
course, prevents any private suit against the State or 
FedPral Governments without the consent of the Govern-
ment to be sued. Hmvever, many attempts have been 
madP to circnrnvent this rule by bringing the action 
against the individual, employee, or public official to in-
directly '.drnt could not be achieved directly. 
Because of this, the courts subsequently adopted the doc-
trine that the impact of governmental immunity could 
not be avoided b:-; bringing the suit against the t'rnployee 
or imblic official in his individual capacity. This principal 
and thP reason therefor are well explained in ] 60 A.L.R. 
33') t ')3') l . . .. _a.,_), .J, w 1erem it says: 
"Howen'r, while a suit against state or Fed-
Pral officials is not a suit against the 
statt•, within tlw rule of immunity of the state from 
suit without its consent, that rule cannot be 
evaded by bringing an action nominally against 
an officer or a board, commission, or department 
in his or its official capacity when the real claim is 
against the sovereign itself, who is the party vitally 
interested. \Vhile in determining whether 
a state was a party to controvPrsy, the court would 
l0ok to the rpcord to see who were the parties, 
that is, the court would not considPr the state a 
party nnless nominally so, this view has long since 
13 
been discarded. The rule is now well settled that a 
suit against an officer as representing the sover-
eign in action and where the state, al-
though not a party to the record, is the real party 
against which relief is sought, and where a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, although nominally against 
the officer as an individual, could operate to con-
trol the action of the state or subject it to liability, 
is to be deemed a suit against the state, and is not 
maintainable unless the state has consented to be 
sued." 
It is respectfully submitted that the case at hand 
is almost identical to the principals set forth above. Al-
though the State Tax Commission is not a party of 
record, if a judgment were rendered in favor of the plain-
tiff against the defendants for their simple act of sending 
out two standard form letters from the governmental 
agency for which they \Vere employed, it would certainly 
act to control the actions of the state, and all state em-
ployees would be hesitant to send out any official cor-
respondence for apprehension of being pen;onally liable. 
This would be especially true for persons charged with 
'the somev,:hat unpleasant task of collecting delinquent 
taxes due to the State of Utah, as are the defendants. 
ThP Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the 
above principals in Sheffield i:. Turner, 21 F.2d 314, 445 
P.2cl 367, (1968), which was a private action against the 
\Varden of the Utah State Prison by an inmate who had 
heen stabbed by a fellow prisoner. The complaint alleged 
that the \,Varden had permitted his employees to super-
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vise the inmates in a negligent manner, which enabled the 
fellow prisoner to enter the plaintiff's quarters and stab 
him. Justice Crockett wrote the opinion of the Utah 
Snpreme Court and stated: 
''The anciently established and almost uni-
,-ersally recognized general rule which this court 
has consistently announced and adhered to is that 
the government, its agencies and officials perform-
ing go'vernmental functions are protected by sover-
eign imrnunity." (Emphasis added). 
'Che anthorities cite<l by the Court for that statement 
"Sehy v. Salt Lake City, -H l-:-tah 535, 125 P. 
(i91, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 915; Bingham v. Board of 
Education of Ogden, 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432; 
Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 
SOO; SpringTille Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 
100, 349 P.2d 137.'' 
Tlw Conrt did dPln· into the question of whether the 
"Ctah GovernmPntal Immunity Act (Sec. 63-30-1, et seq., 
1·tah Code Ann., 1953) had any influence on the above 
::-;tated principals and rases, lrnt the conrt finally con-
dnded, at p. 3fi9: 
··upon our eonsideration of the various as-
pects of thP problem and an examination of the 
anthoritiPs which han• dealt with it, it is onr 
opinion that in a situation such as this, ... the 
1u1rde11 und other prison officrrs are protected 
lJy thf' doctrine of soverei_qn im1111111ity against 
claims of ·11egli9ence so long as they are acting in 
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good faith and within the scope of their duties, 
and that they could ,not be held liable unless they 
were guilty of some conduct which transcended 
the bounds of good faith performance of their 
ditty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which 
they knew or should know would resitlt in injitry ... 
The Court indicated that the reason for its holding was 
"the imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity 
to have reasonable freedom to discharge (their) burden-
some responsibilities ... If such officials are too vulner-
able to lawsuits for anything, ... capable persons would 
be discouraged from taking such public positions." Id. at 
369. 
The above reasons are also clearly present in the case 
at hand, and it is respectfully submitted that the Court 
should hold similarly to Sheffield v. Titrner, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the purpose of the defendants' motion to dismiss, 
the facts are not in controversy, and based on those facts 
there was no claim upon which relief could be granted. 
rrhe sending of two form letters from a governmental 
office is clearly not a sufficient action to establish a tor-
tious claim upon ·which relief could be granted. 
Even if the content of those letters had maliciously 
slandered the plaintiff, which seems inconceivable in this 
rasc, the record shows no bad faith in the defendants 
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performance of those acts, and those acts were clearly 
in the scope of their authority making them immune 
from liability. The law is clear that the impact of gov-
ernmental immunity cannot be avoided by suing a public 
officer in a private suit, and it is respectfully submitted 
that the motion to dismiss should have been granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DA VIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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